What is Leibniz’s conception of perfection?

For Leibniz, metaphysical perfection is a necessary condition for moral perfection in that intellectual apprehension of harmony gives rise to moral perfection. To see how he arrives at this position, it is necessary to return to the other two types of goodness: the moral good and the physical good.

How does Leibniz prove God?

God. The thesis that God acts in the best of all possible ways follows from the notion of God as “an absolutely perfect being” (DM 1). Leibniz accepts Descartes’ ontological proof for the existence of God, which proves the existence of God by way of our idea of perfection, with one caveat.

What exactly is the philosophical problem that Leibniz’s doctrine of pre established harmony is supposed to solve?

Overview. Leibniz’s theory is best known as a solution to the mind–body problem of how mind can interact with the body. Leibniz rejected the idea of physical bodies affecting each other, and explained all physical causation in this way.

What are Leibniz’s monads how do they differ from Descartes immaterial substances?

In fact, even Leibnizian minds in the stricter sense, that is, monads capable of self-consciousness and reasoning, are quite different from the minds in Descartes’s system. While Cartesian minds are conscious of all their mental states, Leibnizian minds are conscious only of a small portion of their states.

How does Leibniz’s pre established harmony establish matters of causation?

The only real causation present in Leibniz’s metaphysics is that within each finite substance and that of God who pre-establishes the harmony among minds and bodies (and minds and minds, and bodies and bodies). So the rest of this entry will address intrasubstantial and divine causation.

What is different about Descartes and Spinoza’s concepts of substance?

However, whereas Descartes held that distinct bodies are distinct extended substances, Spinoza famously holds that there is but one substance—God or nature—and that distinct bodies are merely modes of this one substance, considered as extended.

How does Leibniz argue that substances are free?

Leibniz states: “For they [free or intelligent substances] are not bound by any certain subordinate laws of the universe, but act as it were by a private miracle” (“Necessary and Contingent Truths”). Minds, then, are different from mechanical causes.

How does Leibniz explain the reality of material things?

If the parts of a material thing are themselves material, they again have to borrow their reality from their parts, and so on ad infinitum. If matter is to be anything real we have to end up to basic elements which are no longer divisible but unities by themselves.